"He understood that mobility could offset numerical inferiority. Although this was no new revelation, his interest was awakened, and his attention.......broadened to take account of the tank. By 1929 he had evolved the idea of strategic penetration by armored forces, and, in his own words, had become "convinced that tanks working on their own or in conjunction with infantry could never achieve decisive importance.....what was needed were armored divisions which would include the supporting arms needed to allow the tanks to fight to full effect.....The first strategic surprise attack will penetrate more or less deeply into enemy territory ........The first move of air and mechanized attack will be followed up by motorized infantry divisions. They will be carried to the verge of the occupied territory and hold it, thereby freeing the mobile units for another blow. In the meantime the attacker will be raising a mass army. He has the choice of territory and time for his next big blow....He will do his best to launch the great blow suddenly so as to take the enemy by surprise.........The armored division will no longer stop when the first objectives have been reached; on the contrary, .....they will do their utmost to complete the breakthrough into the enemy lines of communication...." The German Army, 1933-1945, Matthew Cooper |
Matthew Cooper describing the tactical theory of Guderain. This theory was one which had been put into practice in the past: the Schlieffen Plan is not dissimilar to this method of attack. However Blitzkrieg in the Second World War would be rather different, technology had advanced rapidly in the years following the armistice of 1918.
The forces of the Wehrmacht were well preparared for the onslaught in Poland. Forces had combined in 'war games' and many, particularly members fo the Luftwaffe, had experiences of fighting in the Spanish Civil War. In 1936 Hitler sent 19,000 men to assist the Fascists in the Spanish Civil War. The bulk of these men, and accompanying resources, were from the Luftwaffe. The force, known as the Condor Legion, deployed a range of fighter planes and bombers, including dive bombers and was tsked with a number of key roles. The Condor Legion provided reconassance for the Fascist forces, developed an airborne medical corps that could swiftly withdraw wounded men from the battlefield, enaged in troops manoveurs and, most famously, in a range o bombing missions. These provided the men of the luftwaffe with experience of the different functions that they would have to undertake in order to make Blitzkrieg possible. Dive Bombers were deployed to devastating effect in towns such as Guernica, strategic bombing was developed, particularly after the arrival in Sapin of planes from the Soviet Red Airforce.
The army had lready developed its understanding of how to deploy infantry alongside machines. General Hans von Seeckt had insisted on training men in the art of fighting alongside tanks in the 1920's, when German troops secretly trained in the Soviet Union. As Panzer technology had progressed these men became used to communicating via two-way radio (an innovation in tank warfare at the ime), linking with infantry units and had ample opportunity to test theories of warfare.
The following quotation expands on the development of mechanised warfare, training and doctrine in the inter-war era:
| As a result, Russian concepts of the "deep battle"
and the British ideas of pure armor formations were incorporated into German
thinking on armored warfare. The British, under the influences of B.H. Liddell
Hart and J.F.C. Fuller, painted pictures "of entire divisions of tanks
breaking through enemy defenses, and surging through the gaps in an ‘expanding
torrent’ to overwhelm nerve centers in the rear." The Russians,
under Marshal Tuckhachevsky, created the doctrine of "Deep Battle"
which used conventional infantry and cavalry divisions, aviation and mechanized
formations in coordination to "attack the entire depth of the enemy
defenses simultaneously."
"The days are long past when tanks were an auxiliary of the infantry", Guderianstated. He believed that the tank forces should not be attached as an organic unit to infantry formations, but to be used en masse in large formations with all the separate support elements that they needed in order to maneuver independently on the battlefield. In this type of division, everything including support units and infantry would be motorized to keep up with the advancing tanks. By 1935, before writing Achtung-Panzer!, Guderian "was convinced that [the tanks] role should include deep penetrations into the rear to disrupt lines of communication and command and control networks." Other officers who made contributions to this evolution in armored warfare were Oswald Lutz and Alfred von Vollard-Bockelberg. During 1925 as a section leader in the Weapons Office, Lutz produced several studies that led him to conclude that two types of tank were needed: a light tank with high speed, light armor and armament was needed to engage in reconnaissance and screening operations, and a medium tank with heavy armor and weaponry to be a battle tank. The early design of the panzer units reflected some of Lutz’s concepts. Colonel von Vollard-Bockelberg transformed the technical course for motor officers from a maintenance course to one of intense study on tactics and armored warfare strategy. 2LT Sean M. McClure, http://campus.houghton.edu/orgs/rotc/blitzkrieg.htm#theories |